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In 1974, Charles H. Sheldon summed up a debate within the
political science fraternity between "traditionalists" and "behavioralists." The debate appears to have peaked during the 1960s. He
wrote:
This debate has been leveled at the question of the use of values in research and
at the methodologies common to the behavioralists. The dialogue takes a scientific
versus non- or antiscientific perspective, with the behavioralist claiming that the
traditionalist fails to be scientific enough, and the traditionalist arguing that the
behavioralist confuses science with methodology. . . . Robert McCloskey has observed " ... that the fraternity in general is now receptive to the methods and insights ofbehavioralism in so far as it finds them helpful; ... and that the discipline
is about ready for a new movement .... "
The new movement is upon us. . . . The post-behavioral revolution in political
science demands that we be concerned for the contemporary world and its problems
even if we must sacrifice some of our scientific rigor. In Easton's words, " ... it is
better to be vague than non-relevantly precise." . . . In describing, explaining, and
predicting what is and eschewing the ought, [the behavioralist] tends to support the
existing conditions in the world. The realties of the political world tend to be lost in
the abstract context of models and data collection.l7

It is not evident from Judicial Conflict and Consensus that its
editors and contributors were daunted by Sheldon's last sentence.
Because I was perplexed by my own inability to discern the purpose
or utility of much of the research reported in the collection, I paid
attention to the suggested agendas, in almost every chapter and in
an epilogue, for "further research." Suspecting that the studies reported were intended to be incremental, I hoped that the research
agendas would help me to see the larger canvas on which they were
to be increments. Unfortunately, however, most of the agendas
called for more of the same.

JUSTICE AND EQUALITY: HERE AND NOW. Edited
by Frank S. Lucash.I Cornell University Press. 1986. Pp.
170. Cloth, $22.50, paper, $7.95.
David P. Bryden 2

Nearly thirty years ago, a biologist of my acquaintance, on
learning that I planned to study philosophy, said something that
text. B. ScHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT-A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 198 (1983).
17. C. SHELDON, supra note 4, at 228-29 (emphasis in original).
I. Professor of Philosophy, University of Nevada, Reno.
2. Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
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stuck in my mind. "I usually don't understand philosophers," he
confessed, "and when I do understand what they've written I usually don't understand why they bothered to write it." His skepticism, though expressed with unprofessorial directness, was not
heretical. Similar doubts could be found in the latest writings of
philosophers themselves, some of whom devoted their careers to
demonstrating that metaphysics is invariably trivial, false, or obscure.
In those days, political philosophy was commonly regarded as
a current in intellectual history, not a serious method for analyzing
politics. That, I suspect, is still the average layman's view, but in
the academy political philosophy is enjoying something of a vogue.
This comeback, commonly attributed to the influence of John
Rawls, is evident in the work of several constitutional theorists.
Of course, there's philosophy and philosophy. Political philosophy includes much more than the fantasies of Plato and company.
Although lacking scientific rigor, men like Burke, Marx, and Brandeis were talking about how the world works. They may have been
wrong; but they were neither trite nor theological. Despite patches
of metaphysics, their emphasis was descriptive and utilitarian.
Burke's Reflections may not persuade you, but he will at least open
your eyes to some reasons for opposing "just" revolutions. Marx
had great faults, but he will make you sensitive to the relationship
between ideology and class interest. Brandeis may have exaggerated "the curse of bigness," but he was not just playing with words.
As everyone knows, empiricism-whether petty or grandcannot answer all questions. In social research, the methodological
problems are commonly so difficult that scholars disagree about
how to interpret the results, as has happened, for example, with
studies of the deterrent effect of capital punishment. Fearful of
methodological criticisms, social scientists often confine themselves
to measuring gnats' eyebrows, achieving precision at the cost of utility. The more fundamental problem is that most political quarrels
are not amenable to empirical resolution. Even if capital punishment does deter, many will still attack it as inhumane; and even if it
doesn't, many will still applaud it as just.
The inconclusive quality of empirical research does not necessarily make it worthless. Given my prejudices, I may be swayed by
a solitary fact. Still, we all yearn for something more, a system that
will answer ultimate, normative questions.
The attraction of thinkers like Rawls is that they hold out the
promise-or seem to hold out the promise-of filling this epistemological void. But do they deliver the goods? Or was Bentham cor-
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rect when he described the metaphysics of rights as "nonsense on
stilts"?
Justice and Equality is a venture in Rawlsian thought. It contains seven essays about distributive justice. The contributors are
unusually distinguished: Judith Shklar, Charles Taylor, Allan
Bloom, William Galston, G.A. Cohen, Michael Walzer, and Walter
Berns. With such talented and politically varied authors, this book
looks to be a fair test of the Rawlsian enterprise.
Judith Shklar's introductory essay celebrates Rawls's achievement. He showed, she says, that "questions of great ethical urgency, such as the proper balance between liberty and equality,
could be discussed without the slightest loss of rational rigor or
philosophical rectitude." Notice the ambiguities in her formulation. Do "rational rigor" and "philosophical rectitude" imply utility? If political theory is to be a kind of verbal chess, it will be
rigorous but useless-similar, in that respect, to an overly refined
empirical study. I don't mean to imply that political philosophy
should be able to answer every practical question, or even that it
should give a conclusive answer to any practical question. All I ask
is that it tell me something I don't already know about a problem
that interests me. Not necessarily something highly practical, but
something interesting. Surely a collection of essays on equality
should help me to decide, say, whether socialism is desirable. In
constitutional terms, it should shed light on whether the Supreme
Court ought to protect property rights, and whether poverty should
be deemed a "suspect classification."
Judged by that criterion, this book fails. Here, for example, is
Professor Shklar's discussion of property rights:
While in principle everyone says that the state of nature is a ridiculous fiction, it has
not gone away. The reason is not hard to grasp. No one believes in Robinsonades,
colonists without a past, or prepolitical peoples, but there must have been something, some other relationship among people and between people and the resources
of the earth, before there was private property. Nothing can emerge from a void,
after all. There was either communal ownership before private property was established or no possession of resources at all. Since private property is justified in
terms of its origins usually, there must be a before and after. Of course one may
wonder if the first person who claimed to "own" an object was even Homo sapiens,
though that person could and did defend it against all other claims. Property may
be older than we are, but history has no bearing on the question. Social logic requires an either-or choice, communal or private ownership. We left the former but
may yet return to it. The state of nature remains a plausible alternative to every
known historical society, and so it serves as an enduring mirror of possibilities.

It would be unkind to analyze this passage line-by-line. Suffice
it to say that when someone as eminent, as learned, and as moderate
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as Judith Shklar comes so close to gibberish, we have a mystery
worth pondering.
No sensible person justifies the institution of private property
"in terms of its origins." If political philosophers usually do so,
that tells us a good deal more about political philosophers than
about property rights. Private property is justifiable, if at all,
chiefly on utilitarian grounds. Even in socialist countries, it seems
to be a necessary concession to human selfishness. In capitalist
countries, property rights are more extensive; they are essential to a
market economy. If capitalism is preferable to any feasible alternative, then private property is desirable, although of course various
regulations of it may also be desirable. The "state of nature" has no
more bearing on these questions than it does on the contents of the
law school curriculum.
If the institution of private property is viewed as instrumental,
then it is pointless to discuss fables about the state of nature and
social contracts. One must study real-world capitalism and realworld socialism and form conclusions about which system is more
conducive to human well-being. In that endeavor, a sweaty journalist-fresh out of Havana-may be equal or even superior to the
most elegant dialectician at Yale. It is no accident, perhaps, that
dialecticians prefer to discuss the state of nature.
The book's second essay, by Charles Taylor, is called The Nature and Scope of Distributive Justice. Professor Taylor, like Shklar,
analyzes inequality by dispatching a straw man. His straw man is
the theory that those who make a greater contribution to societysurgeons, for example--deserve higher incomes than the rest of us.
Now I suppose that many people do advance this justification for
inequality; it may even be the most common justification. But it is
also the easiest to refute. One might begin by questioning whether a
surgeon makes a "greater contribution" than a garbageman. Definitional questions aside, the contribution argument, when stripped
of all utilitarian overtones, is as weak as metaphysical justifications
of property rights. As Taylor says (quoting Rawls): "(N]o one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a more favorable
starting place in society." "Atomist" modes of thought, Taylor tells
us, "are all illusory." For "the talented individual who makes a
valuable contribution owes much of his or her capacity to society.
It is not just that the training without which this capacity could not
flourish is often provided by the larger society, but also that the
very fact that someone with this capacity can make a large contribution may depend on a given mode of economy or social life."

1987]

BOOK REVIEW

497

And so on. Good points, surely, but not ones that a reasonable
adult will have overlooked.
Taylor does not discuss the most powerful economic argument
for inequality, that it is an essential incentive. Nor does he address
the most powerful sociological justification, that inequality is inevitable, given the wide variations in human talent. Had he done so,
he would quickly have become mired in a morass of difficult realworld issues, such as whether it would suffice to pay auto executives
twice as much as masons and, if so, whether such a reduction in
income disparities is politically feasible. Of all the justifications for
inequality, he selects for rebuttal the argument that inequality is
good in principle. This issue has the great advantage of requiring no
factual research, but the great disadvantage of leading only to banal
conclusions. It's like appraising monarchy by rebutting the divine
right of kings.
Taylor does acknowledge that a totally egalitarian society may
not be appropriate. But, true to his vocation, he does so without
mentioning any of the real-world phenomena associated with radical collectivism. He doesn't say that it is tyrannical, or that it leads
to economic stagnation. He doesn't even say, in so many words,
that inequality is a necessary incentive. The problem, in his account, is that the argument for egalitarianism "assumes a society we
have not yet got." To scrap the contribution principle, says he, we
would have to create
a society in which the major good sought by the majority in engaging in economic
activity was no longer individual prosperity, but, for example, some public goal, or
the intrinsic satisfaction of the work itself; or else a society where people's needs
were few and limited, and where production for the means to life had no interest
beyond a certain modest level of prosperity, but where all surplus energies were
devoted to other things, that is, the kind of society of which the ancients talked and
Rousseau dreamed.

Instead of drawing the obvious conclusion that no such utopia
is attainable, Taylor advises us that one can try to achieve this society in any of several ways: "The Marxist vision of the classless society" is one possibility, "but there are others, such as the ideal of a
commune life based on limited needs in some balance with nature."
Professor Michael Walzer lashes out at another straw man.
For him, private enterprise is obsolete. Why so? Because in early
capitalism "all transactions, or by far the greater number of transactions, can plausibly be talked about in the language of free exchange." This is no longer true:
For corporations are-this is now a commonplace of American political scienceprivate government; their transactions are significantly political in character, taking
the form of command and obedience rather than free exchange; their owners and
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agents make decisions that determine the costs and the risks that other people must
live with.

Although corporate apologists deny that such "private government" exists, "the denial is false" and so "justice requires that we
challenge the exemption and explore systematically the alternatives
to private government: public ownership and workers' control and
various combinations of the two."
Of course, even if old-fashioned capitalism was truly "free exchange," it may have been an inferior economic system; and even if
modem capitalism is "private government," it may be a superior
economic system. These labels raise false issues. The important
question is what we will discover when, in Walzer's words, we "explore systematically" the differences between real capitalism and
real socialism, and this is the question that is avoided, in Walzer's
essay as in the others.
Depending on one's political inclinations, the faults of political
philosophy may seem more glaring in left-wing or in right-wing essays. But the characteristic weaknesses of the genre are not limited
to thinkers of any particular persuasion; conservatives like Walter
Berns employ some of the same rhetorical techniques that I have
criticized in Walzer and Taylor. Berns's essay, Equally Endowed
with Rights, is an eloquent defense of the Hamilton-Harlan thesis
that the foundation of our liberty is the institutional structure established by the original Constitution, more than the Bill of Rights.
This argument, so contrary to a dominant assumption of modem
constitutional thought, is a valuable counterweight to conventional
discussions of rights. It exemplifies the best type of political philosophy, grounded in reality and expounded by a master.
Whether it can carry the weight that Professor Berns wants it
to carry is another question. Berns's sonorous abstractions, like
those of most political philosophers, often hover between platitude
and falsehood, depending on how they are interpreted. He tells us,
for example, that the founders realized that "there is no way, consistent with natural right, that government can guarantee equal success" in the pursuit of happiness. If we take this literally, it is the
baldest of platitudes, a conservative's straw man. (Not even
Michael Walzer would maintain that the government can guarantee
equal happiness.) If we take it less literally, and perceive an innuendo that specific programs like food stamps for the poor are unwise, it ceases to be a platitude but becomes a non sequitur. (From
the undoubted fact that "equal success" is unattainable, it is a very
long leap to the conclusion that inequalities should not be alleviated, which is all the justification any real-world proposal needs.)
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Berns maintains that modern egalitarians favor "equality of
condition rather than the equality of rights affirmed in the Declaration of Independence and embodied in the Constitution." They do
so because, unlike the framers, they refuse "to accept the political
and social consequences of recognizing the respects in which people
are by nature unequal." I happen to agree with that statement, and
I'm happy to see it made. But of course it doesn't tell me anything
useful about any particular issue. A debater could grant all of
Berns's abstractions, yet defend the liberal side of every current social controversy. Comparable worth statutes, for example, are customarily defended as exceptions to market principles. Similarly,
racial criteria in admissions and hiring are defended as exceptions
to traditional criteria. Berns and I may agree that these rationales
are specious, and even occasionally insincere. If we can make a
convincing argument to that effect, we don't need to invoke the
framers' ideas about equality. And if we can't, it won't help to invoke the framers.
The root fallacy of this book would have been obvious if its
title had promised discussions of "poverty" instead of "equality."
Poverty is a colossal problem; equality, except in contexts where it
is merely a euphemism for poverty, or for severe oppression, is a
relatively trivial issue. But "equality" connotes abstract justice;
"poverty" connotes concrete suffering that cries out for remedies.
If the topic is equality, one turns to philosophers; but poverty
plainly calls for more worldly specialists-economists, agronomists,
demographers, some down-to-earth sociologists, and politicians.
They must answer dozens, if not hundreds, of practical questions,
some of which are very large and complex. How much inequality,
and of what sorts, is needed as an incentive to achievement? What
are the political limits on soaking the rich in a capitalist democracy?
Do these limits differ as between small, homogeneous societies like
Sweden and large, heterogeneous ones like the United States? Do
they differ, at bottom, from the difficulties of reducing the privileges
of Soviet officials? How should redistribution be carried out? To
what extent does it necessarily entail loss of civil liberties and indeed of democracy itself? What are its other costs? Are the poor
better off in socialist countries? Is the average man?
Such books have been written. But not, so far as I know, by
philosophers. It would be a good project for one of the contributors
to Justice and Equality.

